




Executive Book Summaries®

FILE: MARKETING



By Pip Coburn

Why Some Technologies Take Off and Others Crash and Burn

THE CHANGE FUNCTION

THE SUMMARY IN BRIEF

The commercial failure rate of nominally great new technologies is troublingly high. The failure rate is consistent with the hatred and distrust most normal human beings have of high technology. The goal of this summary is to look at what has failed in the past, to understand how the industry came to be in the position it is in today, and to spotlight examples of what might and might not work in the future.

Consider the cool new things that have been immediately successful: Apple's iPod, the flat-screen television and Netflix. Now, switch gears and think about the major failures: the video phone, the Segway and the Tablet PC. Billions of dollars ride on this question: Why do some new technologies succeed and others fail?

After years of studying countless winners and losers, author Pip Coburn has come up with an idea that explains why some technologies become huge hits, but others never reach more than a tiny audience. People are only willing to change and accept new technologies when the pain of their current situation outweighs the perceived pain of trying something new. Most potential users are afraid of new technologies, and they need a really great reason to change. If you don't give them that reason, then forget it.

We've all heard it before: "Build it and they will come." Well, the last six years have proven that, at least in the technology industry, this maxim is shockingly — and expensively — untrue. But there's an alternative approach: That's what The Change Function is all about.

What you'll learn in this summary:

- ✓ *How to be a much smarter investor, manager, entrepreneur or tech geek.*
- ✓ *Why technology often fails.*
- ✓ *What can be done to reduce the total perceived pain of adoption.*
- ✓ *How to stay ahead of the game, but keep your customers' needs in focus.*
- ✓ *What it is that customers really want.*

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THE CHANGE FUNCTION

by Pip Coburn

— THE COMPLETE SUMMARY

Silicon Valley, We've Got a Problem

It seems that when tech company executives pitch their ideas in an effort to obtain investments and sales, they focus on themselves, what they have created, and why buyers would be smart enough to figure out how smart their technology is as the price comes down.

The alternative approach is for technology companies to become riveted to the needs and wants of the users they seek. Users are in charge of what they spend their money on — and they always have been. The technologists may be the magicians, but the users have the checkbooks.

At best, gee-whiz technologies are years ahead of schedule. At worst, they are mental indulgences lacking a potential user crisis. Yet gee-whiz tech continually grabs the headlines. So we can rest assured that early next year, the Sunday *New York Times* — among many others — will run a feature on smartphones for the 74th

year in a row, despite the fact that they have been too early with this call for 73 years straight. There *won't* be a piece in that same Sunday *New York Times* about business intelligence software, because the average reader can't get their arms around what it really is, even though corporate customers keep consuming it at a predictably interesting pace.

Bloatware

The mobile phone industry — as a follow-up to its incredible success that was nearly a half-century in the making — created extremely expensive, feature-laden computeresque gizmos called smartphones. These phones have a variety of attributes, so the definition is quite fuzzy, but any phone allowing a user to run an Excel spreadsheet and featuring a Windows or Symbian operating system qualifies as one. They have continuously undersold expectations, much to the dismay of technologists, while “bare bones” phones that accommodate nonserious and nonsmart activities such as \$2 music ring-tone downloads continue to sell.

Supplier-Orientation: More is better. Much more is much better.

User-Orientation: More is confusing. Much more is much more confusing.

Smartphones provide a wonderful namesake for a repository of bloatware. Name the product *smart*, thus

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Decide for Yourself if Technology Is Working

- ✓ Are you tired of trying to remember power cords for business trips?
- ✓ Are you tired of trying to remember to charge your cell phone at night?
- ✓ Are you annoyed by your remote control — correction, are you annoyed by the seven remotes in your home because you can't find the one you really want?
- ✓ Are you annoyed by complex alarm clocks in hotel rooms?
- ✓ Are you annoyed because your back hurts when traveling, perhaps because of all that extra junk you're hauling with you in order to be connected?
- ✓ Does it stink when you don't know how to align spacing in a Word document and spend your day guessing how to fix it?
- ✓ Are you tired of being stuck on a helpline forever, bracing to hear a flurry of TechnoLatin when someone finally does answer?
- ✓ Do you have too many passwords?

The author: Pip Coburn is the founder of Coburn Ventures, an advisory services firm. Before starting his own company, he was a managing director and global technology strategist in the technology group of UBS Investment Research, where he oversaw 120 technology and telecom analysts worldwide. He lives in Pleasantville, New York.

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For additional information on the author, go to: <http://my.summary.com>

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BERNIE SHIRE — *Contributing Editor*

DEBRA A. DEPRINZIO — *Senior Graphic Designer*

LINDA GROSS — *Editor in Chief*

REBECCA S. CLEMENT — *Publisher*

Silicon Valley, We've Got a Problem

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internally legitimizing jamming in *everything*. There suddenly is no such thing as a bad idea. ■

The Change Function

There's a problem. Too often products are designed, developed and marketed by a technology culture that is supplier-oriented to a fault. More often than that, products are created in a build-it-and-they-will-come mentality that relies solely upon Moore's Law for lowering prices and what can be called Grove's Law of generating 10x changes and improvements.

Grove's Law: Build something that's better in some way.

Moore's Law: As price drops — voila! — a market will flourish.

The thinking is that change in technology is a function of Grove's Law multiplied by Moore's Law.

But here's the opportunity: If the technology ecosystem realizes that far greater success is just inches away — that it's the user who decides whether or not to fork over the money, that the user has last say, always has, always will, and if we want to obsess about something other than Moore or Grove — then we might be well served obsessing about the potential users and not just the technology itself.

Crisis Explained

According to Steve McMenamin of Atlantic Systems Guild, "People hate change ... and that's because people hate change ... I want to be sure that you get my point. People really hate change. They really, really do." Back in 1962, Thomas Kuhn wrote *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Kuhn suggested that the entrenched interests in an old paradigm will resist change as long as they can until their own theories start to encounter massive holes in explaining the phenomenon at hand. Crisis precedes change. It takes crisis because change is difficult!

Think of cases at one end of a spectrum relative to new products being offered up in the technology ecosystem, then think of indifference at the other end.

Potential users have some level of reaction from indifference to crisis whenever they encounter a new technology product. People are more apt to change — all else being equal — the higher the level of *crisis* that they have in their current situation.

What are some ways folks have *crisis* in technology? What do folks want so desperately that they might consider their situation a crisis? Even if a new technology solution is disruptive by some technical assessment, it is

often unclear to the users that such is the case regarding their own wants and needs.

That can get some folks in the technical ecosystem really mad. They sometimes revert to calling users *stupid*. The view that non-technical users are morons is pervasive in the technology ecosystem. The conflict may never end — but if you're in the business of waiting to sell technology to six billion people, or even a mere billion, it would pay to give up the idea that potential users are wrong if they don't fawn over your offering.

The good news? Creating technologies does not have to be hit or miss. When do users have a crisis? When all their friends have a flat-screen TV and they feel like dopes admitting that they don't. Who doesn't have a crisis? The guy already satisfied with his cable modem service who's being bombarded with advertisements to switch over to DSL service.

The Total Perceived Pain of Adoption

Why do we open our wallets and decide to buy something, anything? What takes us from being *potential* customers to *actual* customers? Most people say this is an easy question: *When the price is right*. Isn't that all there is to it? Not at all. Much of the time, price accounts for less than 10 percent of the total perceived pain of adoption, or TPPA.

What are the other portions of TPPA? Reading instruction manuals, researching product information, feeling stupid when trying to learn or install a new gadget, experiencing the inability to find a salesperson who can explain the product in English and asking an eight-year old kid for help who responds by saying, "Duh!"

But there's more. As any good marketer knows, "perception" is as much a part of any sale as reality. All one has is the perception of how painful it will be to actually adopt the product and change the habit — how much trauma will be involved in the change. It is a *perception* about the future.

If the level of crisis is higher than the total perceived pain of adopting a new solution, then a change will occur. If the crisis is lower, then things will stay as they are. ■

Is the Technology Industry Ready for Change?

Technology has been a fabled story stemming from as far back as you wish. Certainly as least as far back as the 1947 invention of the transistor at Bell Labs, or the 1958 design of the integrated circuit by Jack Kilby at Texas Instruments.

Technology spread from a geek-to-geek interaction when IBM delivered its Series 360 Mainframe to a

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Is the Technology Industry Ready for Change?

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geek-to-many in 1965 to a geek-to-everyone of the six billion humans populating our little planet today. That's a big change.

Technology Firsts

Product	Inventor	Year
The 1st Video Game	MIT student Steve Russell creates Spacewar, the first interactive computer game, on a Digital PDP-1 mainframe computer	1961
The 1st Internet	ARAPANET is formed to connect four major computers in southwestern U.S.	1969
The 1st Mouse	Douglas Engelbart invents an "x-y position indicator for a display system."	1970
The 1st E-mail	Computer engineer Ray Tomlinson sends a simple text message to himself.	1971
The 1st Ethernet	Bob Metcalfe creates Ethernet to connect computers at Xerox PARC. He started 3Com six years later.	1973
The 1st Personal Computer	The Altair is the first "personal computer" produced in relatively high quantity.	1975
The 1st TCP/IP	Early pioneers of computer networks agree upon a standard for TCP/IP.	1977
The 1st Cell Phone	The first commercial cellular phone system begins operation in Tokyo.	1979
The 1st World Wide Web	In an effort to make the Internet more user-friendly, CERN's European Organization for Nuclear Research invents the World Wide Web.	1991
The 1st Linux System	Twenty-one year-old Linus Torvalds is inspired by the free software movement and creates Linux.	1991

Source: UBS

Monstrous PC Growth

The PC hit the mainstream in the 1990s, nearly three decades after the first PC — the LINC — was created in 1964, and 15 years after Bill Gates dropped out of Harvard. In 1989, less than 20 million PCs were sold globally. Ten years later, the figure was closer to 170 million.

The Internet

The Internet was such a big change from the status quo that even Bill Gates nearly missed it. Look at his book *The Road Ahead* and you'll find little mention of it at all. The practical result of all the technology good news was that from 1993 through 2000, technology companies drew earnings by a compound average growth rate of 25 percent — nearly twice any other sector — and in seven of those eight years, technology was ranked either first or second for earnings growth of all 10 sectors.

The positive disposition toward technology turned maniacal. Peer-to-peer pressure to embrace technologies turned extreme.

But then the tech world collapsed. Nasdaq peaked just past 5000 from a mere 333, then collapsed to 1114, about an 80 percent drop. AOL stock sank from \$55 to \$11 a share. Yahoo! dropped from \$89 to \$7. And these were survivors; most didn't survive.

In technology, from 2000 to 2001 the investment community expected a 24 percent decrease, but in real life delivered a 65 percent decline! Nothing like this ever happened in the 50 years of the technology ecosystem. No one would skate through what Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer called the collapse of three bubbles: the Internet Bubble, the Telecom Bubble and the Y2K Bubble. ■

Why Technology Fails

The Change Function is about understanding the big abstracts and elements that are critical in assessing change. As a Wharton professor put it long ago, "If you need to calculate a net present value to see if a project is a good idea or not, it probably isn't."

The Picturephone

The Picturephone was a device developed by Bell Labs in 1956 as a prototype and launched by AT&T at the 1964 World's Fair in New York. It consisted of a telephone handset and a small TV. In other words, people talking on the phone would be visible to those with whom they were having a phone conversation.

Shortly thereafter, Picturephone service began between New York City, Chicago and Washington, D.C.,

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Why Technology Fails

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at a cost of \$21 for a three-minute call — and that was on top of the hardware cost of around \$500,000 for the Picturephone itself. AT&T executives were convinced that three million units would be operating in homes and offices by the mid-1980s, bringing in revenues of \$5 billion a year.

The Upshot: AT&T banked on network effects to drive adoption of its Picturephone. What it didn't understand was that customers had little innate desire to see live facial expressions at the other end of the line. In other words, there was very little user crisis.

Interactive TV

Interactive TV (ITV) — programming that incorporates interactive graphical “enhancements” such as icons, banners, menus, text fields, streaming video and Web pages — generated massive buzz in the mid 1990s. It was heralded as a revolution in the way viewers would watch TV — among other things, they would be able to instantly read more about the topic presented during a program, download and store related media files, purchase goods, conduct banking activities, and share in real time their knowledge or views about the broadcast. At the time, Myers Reports projected that ITV would reach annual revenues of more than \$32 billion by 2006.

But Interactive TV faced many obstacles to adoption. Ignoring the technological challenges inherent in producing and providing actual ITV content, the failure of the various corporate players to agree on a worldwide standard meant that ITV content was also extremely expensive. Financing ITV was difficult because subscribers weren't willing to pay prices that would cover the advanced services costs, and the targeted advertising programs where ITV providers recovered the remaining balance of the cost were hotly debated as potential invasions of privacy. Due to these challenges, in the mid-1990s ITV failed to meet its promise and was pronounced *dead*.

The Upshot: Interactive TV promised neat things: video on demand and buying stuff on the Home Shopping Network on a remote control instead of a cordless phone. But the advantages that Interactive TV offered were small. Meanwhile, installing Interactive TV and learning how to use a 500-button remote control presented a high TPPA that customers were unwilling to tackle when the status quo worked just fine. The shareholders rebelled against the huge price tag of the rollout.

For additional information on why the Picturephone failed, go to: <http://my.summary.com>

Webvan

Webvan promised to revolutionize the business of grocery shopping. During the late 1990s, Internet supermarkets were heralded as a means to attract explosive consumer demand. Webvan attracted more funding than any e-retailing company except Amazon.com, with high-profile, venture-capital backers such as Benchmark Capital and Sequoia Capital. The company would go on to raise \$375 million in its initial public offering.

Amid the Internet bubble, Webvan came to be valued at \$8 billion and touted an ambitious 26-city plan. Bechtel signed a \$1 billion contract with the company to build a string of high-tech warehouses for about \$30 million each.

But Webvan may have been 10 or 20 years ahead of its time. And like many businesses born in the maniacal days of the dot-com boom, it aimed to get too big, too fast.

The Upshot: Webvan seemed staged to provide a service that would free up its customers' time, otherwise spent in a grocery store. While Webvan's service had its merits, it didn't match to a nationwide crisis. The “crisis” of shopping at an actual grocery store was simply too low in most modern markets, and the uncertainty too great for changing important habits quickly. The perceived pain of adoption may have been larger than the reality, but Webvan wasn't financed in a fashion conducive to waiting out a slow and steady uptake by news customers.

The Alpha Chip

In 1992, Digital Equipment Corporation introduced what it claimed was the world's fastest processor, code-named the Alpha chip. DEC's Alpha chip was a 64-bit microprocessor that ran at 200 megahertz, far faster than any other microprocessor. By comparison, the Intel Pentium chip launched the following spring ran at a mere 66 megahertz. Around 500,000 Alpha-based systems were sold by the end of 2000, but for a long time, the Alpha chip was only used for 64-bit graphics programs that required brute processor speed.

The Upshot: DEC's 64-bit Alpha chip was technically brilliant. But brilliance and innovation alone do not create new markets, despite how much technologists would like to believe that they do. DEC failed to create a network — or an environment — in which its Alpha chip could be embraced. The technology ecosystem failed to support Alpha, so while the crisis was low, the total perceived pain of adoption — the lack of operating systems and applications to support Alpha — was quite high. The biggest fear for users was that they would embrace Alpha and wind up stranded on an island. ■

A Future Winner: Flat Panel Display TV

Flat panel technology promises to provide sharper pictures when used in conjunction with high definition television technology or high definition DVD content. It also promises to save space relative to current technology. But what flat panel technology promises and delivers more than anything is coolness.

In 2004, flat panel display televisions accounted for 9 percent of global television sales. In Japan, flat panels already account for nearly 30 percent of sales. Before long, it's likely that the words *flat panel* will be unnecessary, as *television* will mean a *flat panel television*. Peer pressure will have a profound impact on the marketplace and obviate the need for prices of panels to drop to the extent that supply and demand modeling might suggest.

The Upshot: That flat panel TVs may be considered “boring” by investors is a direct result of how often this technology has been mentioned in the press. This is an upgrade cycle of the one billion-plus global television market, not to mention that flat panels also go with desktops and laptops as well as the emerging public signage market. The total perceived pain of adoption on the basic flat panel television sale boils down to price, as very little education is required. There is a heavy word of mouth and word of sight “coolness” experience factor that may drive sales of flat panel TVs even more effectively than billions of dollars spent on advertising. Our relationship with technology — and its coolness and what owning a particular piece of technology says about who we are — is vital in adoption cycles.

Mobile Enterprise E-Mail

Mobile e-mail in the enterprise promises to assist management in creating an always-on environment in which an entity has access to all resources — including people and their knowledge and problem-solving ability — at all times. The technology promises this while empowering the workforce to be more mobile.

The Upshot: Some readers may assume that everyone already has a Blackberry. But with only 4.3 million Blackberry subscribers in late 2005 and 50 million “mobile” workers in the United States alone, saturation hardly seems to be the case. The icing on the cake is that the total perceived pain of adopting a technology that mimics an application most people already know and are familiar with — e-mail — is very low. Mobile e-mail may be one of the biggest winners as a result.

Satellite Radio

Satellite radio promises to bring users a far greater amount of well-organized, crisp, dependable and commercial-free content than that provided by traditional radio.

The Idiocy Factor

This is the point when a growing number of people feel like idiots if they have to fess up to not owning _____ (fill-in-the-blank) technology. To be clear: people aren't *actually* idiots — they just *feel* like idiots.

- ✓ *So ... do people buy technology just because it's better?*
Nah!
- ✓ *Do technologists think that if they build something that is just flat-out better, then they will create a market?*
Yes.
- ✓ *Are these two perspectives at odds?*
Often.
- ✓ *Who decides who is right?*
The customer is always right.

Car manufacturers have been installing satellite radio receivers in some models for a few years, and General Motors has invested about \$100 million in XM Satellite Radio since it began installing XM receivers in 2001.

When he forecasted the market in a February 17, 2005, report titled “Initiating Coverage: Satellite Radio Sector,” UBS's Lucas Binder projected that total subscribers in North America would grow from 4.4 million to 55 million in 10 years. He's since upped that estimate to 62.7 million, and recently reported expecting 39.7 million users by 2010.

The Upshot: Satellite radio is radio — only better. There's far more content — as in 100 plus channels — including plenty of sports from around the United States. On the total perceived pain of adoption, satellite radio is not so much as a new technology, but more of an upgrade with near-zero education required. The total perceived pain of adoption will drop even further as the requirement for a trip to Best Buy will disappear as the service comes bundled with the sale of new cars. ■

For additional information on the adoption of flat panel TVs, go to: <http://my.summary.com>

One Future Loser: RFID

RFID (radio frequency identification) is a generic term for technologies that use radio waves to identify people or objects, and also promises to save expenses through the food chain through greater efficiency, better inventory management, lower personnel expense, lower theft, as well as better stocking of popular products to reduce revenue loss that occurs when sales walk to other providers. RFID is currently being used for any number of tasks,

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One Future Loser: RFID

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from tracking pets and livestock to triggering equipment down oil wells and automating tollbooths on highways through very successful applications like E-ZPass.

The Upshot: There are two very big problems with RFID. First, the winners are mainly limited to one node in the extensive global technology food chain, and those benefits are still fairly unclear. Though publicity has been high, it is barely into the first stages of trials of the technology. Second, the costs are theoretically absorbed by those who gain no benefit for their trouble and who will likely resist participating.

However, concerns about privacy have now and again gotten in the way. In reality, much of the privacy fear spread among those who might buy products with tags affixed was ridiculously exaggerated.

Are some of the privacy concerns wildly out of touch with reality? Yes. Does that mean they are unimportant in the process of making RFID a widespread mainstream technology? No.

The Entertainment PC

The promise of the entertainment PC is not exactly clear. A minority of people have purchased a flat panel display, a good percentage of homes have broadband, but only a small number are bothering to network their broadband. As a core element in the digital home, the entertainment PC has barely happened at all.

Designed first and foremost for flawless multimedia playback and secondly for playing games, the ultimate promise is to change the way users think about photos, music and movies. Instead of having photo albums, CDs and DVDs, the entertainment PC allows you to keep everything in one central place.

The Upshot: The “digital home” is a catch phrase — as opposed to a technology — chasing a crisis. Until folks bemoan the fact that their DVD player connects to the TV with cables, and the TV to the cable box with more cables, having a centralized entertainment hub in the home is just not critical.

Consumer electronics makers and even enterprise-focused technology companies are in crisis — seeking new revenue streams by introducing a plethora of cool “digital home solutions” like the entertainment PC, but consumers aren’t there yet. In 10 years? Sure. ■

The Change Function in Action

To truly appreciate the power of the Change Function, it needs to be seen in the real world — not just the printed page. The following two case studies focused on two very cool companies immersed in a user-centric culture.

RFID Growth Drivers and Barriers to Adoption

Growth Drivers

Need for supply chain efficiencies (i.e., cut labor costs, better inventory tracking)

High costs of shrinkage and “out of stock” conditions

Opportunity to reengineer supply chain business processes

Compliance deadlines set by large enterprises (Wal-Mart, Department of Defense)

Source: UBS

Barriers to Adoption

Tag and reader costs

Accuracy of technology

Lack of standards for interoperability

Privacy concerns

Salesforce.com

In another year or two, Salesforce.com may become a household name, as more and more folks determine they better darn well use some form of customer relationship management software as provided by someone such as — or particularly — Salesforce.com.

Where do they get the ideas for their changes? From their users, in the form of complaints and suggestions, as well as studying customer activity itself.

As Salesforce.com makes clear responsiveness to customer complaints and feature suggestions, you might imagine that more customers will take the time to make their own suggestions, which will further help in code-sign and codevelopment. Across time, users will feel like part of the community.

Reactrix

This company does new media advertising. One Reactrix system is an approximately five-foot by eight-foot image on the floor of the Sony Metreon Complex between tickets and concessions, representing a variety of advertisers, like JAL Airways, Adidas and Orville Redenbacher popcorn. Thanks to Reactrix, the image on the floor reacted — hence Reactrix — to your movements as you entered the advertisement space by standing on the Reactrix system.

In this age, traditional advertising media like newspaper, radio and television are all losing sway or steadily collapsing. There is a large appetite for new forms of advertising. So the advertising industry’s crisis means that things like Reactrix’s engaging systems are getting a good look by all.

Is it a fad? People say it’s all about the content, not the technology. Reactrix shares a common trait of all

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Ten Sets of Questions

1. *The Core Sense of Success*

- What is your sense of the percent of newly introduced products that will fail?
- What are the core aspects of successful products today versus 1998?

2. *Tracking Success and Failure*

- What are the criteria you'll use to decide to pull a product if it isn't working?
- What will account for your product not being successful?

3. *Moore's Law Multiplied by Groves Law, Part One*

- Forgetting profitability for a moment, can you describe your sense of price elasticity for the product?
- Is your product disruptive, and if so, why?

4. *Moore's Law Multiplied by Grove's Law, Part Two*

- After technological considerations are eliminated and you're happy with the price points, what else needs to be done for this product to sell so well?

5. *Crisis*

- What "service" are you selling?
- What is the user crisis you intend to solve?

6. *Total Perceived Pain of Adoption*

- What are the top five reasons a user with this "crisis" will not buy this product?
- When do you introduce the client into the design process and why?

7. *Customized Weighing Machines*

- Who exactly is your customer?
- What does crisis vs. TPPA look like for the first 5 percent of your potential market?

8. *Internal Design and Development*

- What doesn't work in your R&D, design and development process?
- What steps do you take to eliminate the typical tension between the design and development team?

9. *Ability to Change*

- What is the biggest change you have instituted in the organization in the last three years?
- What was your biggest failure in past product creation?

10. *Learn-Relearn*

- Is it more important to focus on increasing a user's perceived crisis or lowering their TPPA?

The Change Function in Action

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great user-centric entities. They are unsatisfied. Company founder Matt Bell is a technologist driven by the opportunity to create an even greater difference through technology. ■

What to Do?

The primary goal of the Change Function model is to open up the possible prescriptions for addressing technology's current malaise, and point out that technology companies have consistently failed to figure out what people want.

The To-Dos of the Change Function

The Change Function is a framework in which to uncover insight in a systematic way by continually asking about users' crises and their total perceived pain of adoption. The model takes information as input and delivers insight as output by asking two simple questions:

1. What can be done to *increase* User Crisis?
2. What can be done to *reduce* Total Perceived Pain of Adoption?

In an effort to keep the technology industry from consisting of solutions looking for problems, the following must be undertaken:

- **To Do 1:** Employ rapid prototyping, continuous iteration and codesign.
- **To Do 2:** Hire real anthropologists, create guiding "crises" and fill the gap.
- **To Do 3:** Utilize true observers, try on personas and emphasize cultural change.

The Heart of the Change Function

Technology will only be accidentally successful if the focus is on what can be created. Systematic success — whether it's in creating new products, building great companies or changing the world — comes to those who manage to see the world through the eyes of others ... to understand their crises and to help them find less painful ways of changing their world for the better. ■



If you liked *The Change Function*, you'll also like:

1. ***The Long Tail* by Chris Anderson.** According to Anderson, in this brave new world of niche markets, the future of business is selling less of more.
2. ***Origin of Wealth* by Eric D. Beinhocker.** For the business-minded, as for academics, learn about the evolution, complexity and the radical remaking of our economy.
3. ***Dealing With Darwin* by Geoffrey A. Moore.** Moore looks at how great companies innovate at every phase of the evolutionary cycle, and when it's not worth it.
4. ***Naked Conversations* by Robert Scoble and Shel Israel.** Blogs are changing the way businesses talk with their customers and the outside world, but it's not for everyone.
5. ***Ambient Findability* by Peter Morville.** What does it mean to be "findable" in this day and age? This eye-opening book examines the convergence of information and connectivity.