



The Wide Lens

A New Strategy for Innovation

THE SUMMARY IN BRIEF

How can great companies do everything right — identify real customer needs, deliver excellent innovations, beat their competition to market — and still fail?


The truth is that many companies fail because they focus too intensely on their own innovations, while neglecting the innovation ecosystems on which their success depends. In our increasingly interdependent world, winning means more than just delivering on your own promises; it means ensuring that a host of partners — some visible, some hidden — deliver on their promises, too.

In *The Wide Lens*, innovation expert Ron Adner draws on more than a decade of research and field testing to take you on far-ranging journeys from Kenya to California, from transport to telecommunications, to reveal the hidden structure of success.

A riveting study that offers a new perspective on triumphs like Apple's path to market dominance, monumental failures like Michelin with run-flat tires and Pfizer with inhalable insulin, and still unresolved efforts like electric cars and electronic health records. *The Wide Lens* offers a powerful new set of frameworks and tools that will multiply your odds of innovation success. *The Wide Lens* will change the way you see, the way you think and the way you win.

IN THIS SUMMARY, YOU WILL LEARN:

- Why things go wrong when you do everything right.
- How to see yourself as part of an innovation ecosystem.
- How to manage your ecosystem's roles and relationships.
- How to reconfigure the ecosystem to work for you.



by Ron Adner

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THE COMPLETE SUMMARY: THE WIDE LENS

by Ron Adner

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Why Things Go Wrong When You Do Everything Right

More and more, managers and executives are being pushed into a world of greater collaboration. The upside is that, by working in concert with others within and across organizations, you can accomplish greater things with greater efficiency than you could ever accomplish alone. The downside is that your success now depends not just on your own efforts, but on your collaborators' efforts as well. You are now an actor within a broader innovation ecosystem. Success in a connected world requires that you manage your dependence. But before you can manage your dependence, you need to see it and understand it. Even the greatest companies can be blindsided by this shift.

Michelin: The Run-Flat Saga

In 1992, a small group of Michelin executives conducted a breakout session. The goal? To come up with the next big innovation, one that would spur sales, grow profits, and redefine the way consumers would think about tires. The result — the PAX System — launched Michelin on an ambitious path to transform the entire tire industry.

The PAX System was a run-flat tire that would continue to “run flat” and not sacrifice performance even if punctured. If you suffered a blowout with run-flat tires, you could continue to drive as if nothing had happened. No need for an emergency pull over. Instead, a light on your dashboard would let you know a puncture had occurred and that you could drive for another 125 miles, at up to 55 mph, before pulling into a garage to get the tire repaired.

In June 2000, Michelin unveiled its masterstroke: an unprecedented alliance with Goodyear, the world's second-largest tire maker. Widespread adoption of the PAX System technology no longer seemed a question of *if*, but *when*.

By the end of 2004, J.D. Power & Associates had come out with a new survey predicting that by 2010 more than 80 percent of cars would be fitted with run-flats.

Honda announced that, beginning in 2005, it would equip its best-selling Odyssey minivan with PAX tires. To ensure a successful launch, Michelin and Honda embarked on unprecedented coordination. Michelin boosted the standard PAX warranty to cover the first two years of driving or 50 percent of tread wear and began training and certifying Honda dealers and tire dealerships with PAX.

Confronting Failure

In the rush to market, however, many Honda dealers were not ready. Problems surrounding PAX were mounting and eroding carmakers' initial enthusiasm. Most pressing was growing consumer frustration with the difficulty of finding service centers that could repair the tires. Unable to repair flats, many drivers were forced instead to purchase brand-new tires. At around \$300 per tire, the run-flat value proposition was rapidly eroding.

Several class-action lawsuits were filed alleging that Michelin, Honda, and Nissan had “never disclosed that neither they nor any third parties maintained sufficient repair or replacement facilities.” In November 2007, Michelin formally announced an end to further development of PAX.



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The very nature of the PAX system required a different path to market, one which would add new actors and new interactions to the system. First, it required automakers to provide a very different level of support than was necessary for traditional new tires. Second, it required new car dealers to enter the picture. Now sales also depended on whether the salesperson was incentivized to guide customers to buy the PAX package option versus, say, a GPS or satellite radio package. Finally, and most critically, PAX required service garages to enter the picture in an entirely new way. For garages, repairing innovative tires had never required any major change to their activities, equipment or capabilities. But repairing a PAX tire was different: the garage needed completely new equipment to clamp and unclamp the tire, new tools to calibrate the tire pressure monitoring system and new training for its repair staff. What's more, Michelin required technicians to undergo a rigorous certification process.

Is There a Better Way?

Ecosystem reconfiguration is at the heart of every new value proposition that breaks from the existing industry mold. Any organization that aspires to transition from stand-alone products to integrated solutions, from insulated projects to collaborative systems, is signing on to a transformation of this sort.

For many companies, managing innovation ecosystems is problematic because the tools and systems they have honed over years of managing successful stand-alone innovations are ill suited to address the interdependence challenges that are inherent in the transition to ecosystems. The failure of PAX was such a surprising defeat because, from a traditional perspective, Michelin did everything right. The company's mistake was its failure to understand the innovation ecosystem on which its success depended. Michelin's failure was rooted in its inability to bring enough service stations on board with the PAX system. ●

Co-Innovation Risk: Seeing the Real Odds When You Don't Innovate Alone

Competent managers know that success requires obsessive focus on capabilities, customers and the competition. But too often they fall victim to the blind spot of co-innovation risk. While managers have rich processes in place to assess and manage their own execution challenges ("What do I need to do to deliver my

project on time, to spec, ahead of the competition?"), they do not fully understand their dependence on their partners' co-innovation challenges ("What are the hurdles facing the other innovations that must come about for my project to succeed?"). Regardless of the nature of the complementary innovation — technological, procedural or organizational — co-innovation risk transforms the odds of success.

Nokia: Building a 3G Phone Too Soon

Nokia had been working on 3G prototypes since the early 1990s, but even with deep expertise in the handset market, the challenges kept growing. As one observer noted, "The 3G handsets, on which Europe has wagered much of its tech future, are by far the most complex consumer electronics devices ever designed. To succeed, they must combine the wealth of applications available on a computer with the roving versatility of a mobile phone."

It was a huge execution challenge, but, in the end, Nokia did it. They had beaten Ericsson. But the euphoric welcome for the 3G handset innovation would prove to be out of step with the new world that 3G represented. Nokia had forecasted that, by 2002, more than 300 million handsets would be connected to the mobile Internet. The actual number was closer to 3 million. The 300 million target was eventually reached, but not until 2008.

At the root of Nokia's mistake was a fundamental misunderstanding of co-innovation risk. The 3G vision was a vision of an entire mobile lifestyle — personalized videos streamed to your phone, location-based services, automated payment systems, applications to empower a mobile workforce. Until these other partners delivered on their innovations, Nokia's 3G handset would create about as much value as a \$400 paperweight.

Collaboration = Dependence

The extent of your co-innovation risk depends on the joint probability that each of your partners will be able to satisfy their innovation commitments within a specific time frame.

The real question is not *if* it can be done, but *when*. Not just when will we be able to complete the project, but when will we be able to align the necessary ecosystem for the complete value proposition to become a reality? Once we understand co-innovation risk, the ways in which we prioritize opportunities and threats, the ways we think about market timing and positioning, and the ways we think about designing our offers and mitigating our risks all shift. This is the good news: By

seeing what is actually driving the odds of success, we improve our odds of success. ●

Adoption Chain Risk: Seeing All the Customers Before Your End Consumer

A range of intermediaries stand between you and your end customer: the distributor to bring your product to market, the retailer to showcase it, and the salesperson to sell it. Your success depends on each of these partners adopting your innovation and seeing the value it will create for them. If any one is not on board, you will never reach your end customer. When does the best product lose? When the consumer doesn't have a chance to choose it.

From Adoption to Adoption Chains

In today's interdependent world, the successful innovator must treat each partner as a customer — even if they are not in a direct business relationship. Whereas the logic of co-innovation is one of multiplication (not averages), adoption chains follow a logic of minimums (not net surplus).

Consider two innovation proposals, A and B. Both require that your innovation pass through two intermediaries before reaching the end customer: the distributor who sells the product to a retailer, who then sells to the end customer. Innovation A creates high value for the innovator (highly profitable, with a surplus of +4), high value for the distributor (+3), slightly negative value for the retailer (higher up-front costs, retraining and service headaches, despite slightly higher margins, a deficit of -1), and very high value for the end customer (+5). Innovation B creates positive, but low, surplus for everyone (+1 for each actor). The net system surplus created by innovation A is 11 (4+3-1+5). The net system surplus created by innovation B is 4 (1+1+1+1). Which would you bet on?

Each and every intermediary needs to see surplus from adopting the innovation. Innovation A will fail because the end customer will never have the chance to choose it. As long as the retailer is worse off with innovation A than with its current alternative, it will be a broken link in the adoption chain. Despite its lower value creation, innovation B will sail through the adoption chain.

The Digital Cinema Challenge

As analog formats throughout the media world were falling away, the transition to digital cinema seemed a

certainty. The value proposition was unambiguous: higher-resolution picture quality, better protection from piracy, flexibility of programming, the potential for 3-D screening, and — for the studios — the elimination of costly film prints.

The big movie studios certainly saw value in supporting and advancing digital cinema. The distribution arm of the studios, as well as independent distributors, would also benefit from greater flexibility of tailoring the movie to a specific audience.

So if everyone saw the benefit of adopting digital cinema, where was the problem? The answer lies with one player for whom the benefits were high, but not high enough to offset their total cost: the movie theaters.

Digital cinema promised big net benefits not just to the movie studios, but to the aggregate ecosystem as well. The challenge was to find a win-win-win-win proposition — some way to share enough surplus with theaters to make them *want to* come on board.

In order for mass adoption of digital cinema to take place, leadership was required from the only party with enough economic incentive and resources to matter: the movie studios. Neither the independent distributors nor the equipment suppliers were in a position to lead due to fragmentation, limited bargaining power over exhibitors, and a lack of financial sway. The integrators made a great leap for digital cinema by launching the VPF (virtual print fee) program, a financing innovation that allows studios to subsidize the high cost of digital cinema adoption in theaters. But without the participation of the studios, the financing framework would have fallen flat. It was the studios that, by initially moving away from celluloid film, setting digital standards, and later collaborating with digital theater integrators, cleared the path for widespread adoption of digital cinema. With VPF, the studios stepped into a new role, creating a new set of links into the ecosystem. They found a brilliant solution to induce the digital changeover. ●

Mapping the Ecosystem: Identifying Pieces and Places

A world of ecosystems is a world of permutations — A, B, C, and D all need to work together simultaneously. The challenge is usually not that partners openly disagree about what must happen first or who is responsible for what; it's that these questions are not sufficiently explored. Instead, having agreed on the end vision, the partners assume that they also agree on the best path to get there. When the value proposition requires multiple

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elements to converge, you need an approach that will allow you to assess alternative configurations, and generate shared understanding and agreement among the partners as to how these elements should come together.

The Value Blueprint

The value blueprint is a mapping tool that makes your ecosystem and dependencies explicit. The steps to construct a value blueprint are straightforward:

1. Identify your end customer. Ask: Who is the final target of the value proposition? Who ultimately needs to adopt our innovation for us to claim success?
2. Identify your own project. Ask: What is it that we need to deliver?
3. Identify your suppliers. Ask: What inputs will we need to build our offer?
4. Identify your intermediaries. Ask: Who stands between us and the end customer? Who touches our innovation after us, and to whom do they pass it on the way to the end customer?
5. Identify your complementors. For each intermediary ask: Does anything else need to happen before this intermediary can adopt the offer and move it forward to the end customer?
6. Identify the risks in the ecosystem. For every element on the map ask: a) What is the level of co-innovation risk this element presents — how able are they to undertake the required activity? b) What is the level of adoption risk this element presents — how willing are they to undertake the required activity?

It is often most productive to characterize the status of each element along a green-yellow-red traffic light continuum.

7. For every partner whose status is *not* green, work to understand the cause of the problem and identify a viable solution.
8. Update the blueprint on a regular basis. As conditions change over time, the blueprint will need to be modified accordingly.

It is rare for a significant innovation to start life with an all-green-light blueprint. It is also not necessary. Yellow lights are signs of delays to come, but they need not be showstoppers. Red lights, however, are a major problem. Any red light that appears on your map must be addressed.

Pfizer: The Promise of Inhalable Insulin

In 1998, the race to market for pulmonary insulin began in earnest. Expectations were high, but develop-

ing inhalable insulin was a monumental task. Pfizer's U.S. head of pharmaceutical business stated: "Pfizer had to create the means to manufacture inhalable insulin, a substance that had never existed before ... Exubera is as much a manufacturing innovation as it is a breakthrough medical advance."

In its approval, the FDA posed a requirement that all patients have a pulmonary function test to make sure their lungs were able to absorb the insulin. Pfizer's strategy called for an initial rollout targeting experienced endocrinologists and diabetologists who had "a wealth of experience ... with this patient population." Its plan was to get this critical opinion-leading segment on board and only then, four to six months later, start rolling out the drug to general practitioners (GPs).

By the end of 2006, Exubera sales were "negligible." By July 2007, Pfizer reported that sales "continued to be disappointing." In October of 2007, Pfizer pulled the plug; Exubera was dead.

Pfizer's plan (which followed the tried-and-true industry norm) hinged on specialists adopting the new product first. While spirometers are standard equipment in a GPs office, used to test for asthma, they have no natural place in an endocrinology practice. Thus, the specialist would need to refer the patient to another doctor and then set up a second patient visit before treatment. Consider that there is an acute shortage of endocrinologists in the United States. Waiting times for an appointment can be three, even nine months.

Had they used a wider lens, Pfizer would have seen the one piece of the puzzle they didn't account for — the blind spot that was so easy to miss unless you were actively looking for breakdowns. The moment the lung function test became a regulatory requirement, success required a plan to solve the endocrinologist's "lung-test loop." In the absence of such a plan, failure was virtually guaranteed. ●

Roles and Relationships: To Lead or Follow in the Innovation Ecosystem?

The leader is not the one who says, "I'm the leader." He's the one about whom everyone else says, "He's the leader." This is the litmus test of leadership. Creating followership among partnering firms entails more than just having a sound strategic vision or a great preexisting brand. In most cases, creating followership entails first making the up-front investments and taking the up-front risks required to get the system working, and only later reaping the rewards.

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The Case for Followership

By definition, any successful ecosystem is filled with followers who win. Their piece of the pie may be smaller than the leader's, but they bear a much smaller risk.

The litmus test for leadership is that everyone else agrees to follow — which only happens when everyone else wins, too. An effective leader creates the ecosystem's structure, establishes fair standards and consistency, and convinces potential followers that there is value in it for them.

Ultimately, in a successful ecosystem, leaders and followers both prosper. It falls on you to prioritize where you want to lead, whom you want to follow, and — if neither choice is appealing — when to opt out and wait for a better opportunity. ●

The Right Place and the Right Time: When Does the Early Bird Get the Worm?

Although conventional wisdom applauds the pursuit of early-mover advantage, the complexity of innovation ecosystems can overturn this logic. The usual focus on getting products to market creates a dangerous blind spot when it comes to timing entry: the early bird may get the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.

The iPod Wins, Three Years Late

In 1979, the Walkman was introduced in the Japanese market. Consumers, already accustomed to playing cassettes on boom boxes and car stereos, were eager to emulate the happy youths of Sony's ads — roller-skating, picnicking and jogging, all while listening to their favorite music. Soon Sanyo, Panasonic, Sharp, Philips, and other electronics leaders joined the fray.

Jump ahead to the late 1990s. Which MP3 player would get there first and become the next Walkman? In 1998, South Korea's SaeHan Information Systems created the world's first portable digital audio player, MPMan. SaeHan saw the market, delivered the product, embraced the right file format, and did it all before the competition. But it did not enjoy a first-mover advantage. Without the extensive access to MP3s and broadband, the value proposition could not come together.

In 1997, Steve Jobs returned to Apple. Jobs was a pioneer of digital and media. It is inconceivable that digital music was not on his radar. In 1998, as MPMan and others launched, he didn't budge. In 1999, as Shawn Fanning introduced Napster (illegally), unleashing a vast catalog of free MP3 content to the world, Jobs still

didn't move. Jobs understood that, in order for the device to have value, other co-innovators in the MP3 player ecosystem first needed to be aligned. In October 2001, when Apple announced the iPod, those pieces were solidly in place: both MP3s and broadband were finally available.

Why is it that this technology succeeded to such a great extent where others barely made any progress at all? In 1998, Jobs said, "These waves of technology, you can see them way before they happen, and you just have to choose wisely which ones you're going to surf. If you choose unwisely, then you can waste a lot of energy, but if you choose wisely, it actually unfolds fairly slowly. It takes years."

Early-Mover Advantage and Disadvantage

Because early movers, by definition, pioneer new market space, they are exposed to greater uncertainties than laggards. There is no prize for those who get it wrong first. While early movers flail about trying to find the right product architecture to position in the right market segment, it is the latecomers that reap benefits of pioneering failures. The relevant question for managers is not whether early movers can be advantaged, but, rather, under what conditions they will be advantaged.

If you allow yourself to look beyond your own innovation challenges at the entirety of the value proposition, timing clues abound. It shouldn't take a visionary to see that demand for MP3 players won't take off until users have easy access to the actual product. Nevertheless, it does take willpower to resist the natural urge to rush forward. Self-imposed delays go against the grain of most leaders and organizations.

The ecosystem is a puzzle that needs to be assembled. The prize does not go to the first player to put down the first piece — because nothing happens till the puzzle is complete. The prize is only awarded after someone puts down the last piece. ●

Changing the Game: Reconfiguring the Ecosystem to Work for You

For digital cinema and Apple's iPod, the shift from red to green was not just a matter of working harder, or of incentivizing and cajoling partners to ensure that each piece of the ecosystem puzzle fell into place. Rather, in each case, success came from first recognizing the key constraints that held back value creation and then taking bold steps to reconfigure the blueprint to work around those constraints.

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Innovating in ecosystems demands not just innovation in the discrete elements, but also innovation in the way in which the elements come together — innovation in the blueprint itself. The Five Levers of Ecosystem Reconfiguration can be used to modify your value blueprint to eliminate the adoption and co-innovation bottlenecks to your value creation.

The Five Levers of Ecosystem Reconfiguration

Reconfiguring an ecosystem entails changing the pattern of interaction among the elements in the system. Taking any value blueprint as a starting point, we can ask five fundamental questions to uncover a new configuration that can eliminate the problematic bottlenecks:

1. What can be separated? Is there an opportunity to decouple elements in a way that can create new value?
2. What can be combined? Is there an opportunity to bundle elements that are currently uncoupled?
3. What can be relocated? Is there an opportunity to shift existing elements to new positions in the ecosystem?
4. What can be added? Are there elements that are currently absent but whose introduction to the ecosystem can create new value?
5. What can be subtracted? Are there elements whose elimination from the ecosystem could be accommodated in a way that would allow for the creation of new value?

Employing the levers, alone or in combination, can be helpful in revealing the path to a viable solution.

Challenges in the Electric Vehicle Ecosystem

From the start, the electric vehicle (EV) has been perceived as an ecosystem problem. Looking at the EV proposition through a wide lens reveals a list of challenges that goes beyond simply building an electric car that goes the distance. The core hurdles have to do with the general problems surrounding electricity: generating it, storing it, delivering it, and — for drivers — paying for it. Consider the six EV problems:

Problem A: purchase price premium

Problem B: limited driving range

Problem C: charging infrastructure

Problem D: battery resale value

Problem E: limited driving range limits savings

Problem F: electric grid capacity.

Better Place is attempting to reconfigure the EV

ecosystem. The company's starting premises: For economic attractiveness, consumers should not own the battery (problems A and D). For both functional and economic attractiveness, range and convenience cannot be limited (problems B, C, and E). For scalable success, the existing electric grid cannot be disturbed (problem F).

Better Place's approach is not to innovate the electric car, but, rather, to innovate the ecosystem around the car.

1. *Separate.* The central modification of the Better Place offer is the separation of the battery, a move that goes far in solving the stubborn problem of battery economics from the consumer's perspective.
2. *Combine.* By linking the battery, charging infrastructure, and the purchase of electricity through the grid, Better Place gives the utilities the opportunity to serve more demand (and sell more power) without new investment in capacity or distribution.
3. *Relocate.* In the traditional EV model, the burden of paying for electricity falls on the consumer. In the Better Place model, it is the company that manages the transaction with the power providers.
4. *Add.* With its overarching operating system, Better Place adds a key component that facilitates energy management throughout the ecosystem. And because it has relieved the consumer from ownership of a specific battery, Better Place is able to introduce a battery switch station as a solution to the problem of driving range.
5. *Subtract.* With its operating system tying together the electric distribution system, the charging infrastructure, and the actual charging schedule of the batteries, Better Place is able to eliminate the need for a smart-grid infrastructure to solve the grid overload problem.

The goal is not to eliminate risk. The goal is to shift risk to locations in which it can be managed effectively. At the very least, Better Place's efforts will be instructive. At the most, they will be truly transformative. ●

Sequencing Success and Multiplying Your Odds of Success

Constructing an ecosystem takes both time and direction. But it also requires a clear plan for the sequence in which the structure will be built. In the world of product innovation, the standard development sequence transitions from prototype to pilot to rollout. This approach is well-suited to the world of stand-alone innovations in which the construction of the offer itself is under your

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control. In the world of innovation ecosystems, the challenge is that delivering your value proposition requires multiple partners to agree, align and commit. There are three guiding principles for sequencing the successful construction of ecosystems:

- 1. Minimum Viable Footprint (MVF):** the smallest configuration of elements that can be brought together and still create unique commercial value.
- 2. Staged Expansion:** the order in which additional elements can be added so that each new element benefits and increases the value creation potential.
- 3. Ecosystem Carryover:** the process of leveraging elements developed in the construction of one ecosystem to enable the construction of a second ecosystem.

A Choice of Paths: Pilots vs. Footprints

Rather than the piloting approach of scaling up a fully developed value proposition, the MVF approach means that the innovator first rolls out a basic value proposition at commercial scale and only then moves to enhance the value proposition to its full potential in a series of staged expansions. The difference — in terms of leadership clarity, blueprint cohesion and partner management — is staggering.

By establishing a base of consumers, the MVF reduces (but does not eliminate) demand uncertainty for partners and lowers the hurdles to bringing them onboard. And the organization that drives the MVF establishes itself as the de facto ecosystem leader — both because it has clear ownership of the customer base and because it is in control of the order in which additional partners will be invited to come onboard.

Driving staged expansion from an MVF is a powerful pathway to success. And continued expansion within the ecosystem is a compelling avenue to continued growth. Building a successful ecosystem, however, offers an additional strategy lever: ecosystem carryover, leveraging your success in constructing one ecosystem to create advantage in constructing a new ecosystem.

We can see the principle of ecosystem carryover underlying many successful transformations. FedEx's growth from overnight shipping to orchestrating a range of supply chain and inventory management services, eBay's extension from online auction house (its original MVF) to virtual shopping mall to e-payment broker (PayPal) to creditor (Bill Me Later), Facebook's expansion from social network to media platform, and Amazon's creation of business-to-business service offers alongside its retail operations were all driven by the same fundamental principles of MVF, staged expansion, and

ecosystem carryover. Beyond a clear focus on their own capabilities, these firms were meticulous in their approach to configuring external elements *around* those capabilities.

Multiplying Your Odds

Before diving too deeply into a new initiative, make sure you understand the ecosystem into which you will need to integrate. If you begin the innovation process by looking at the innovation ecosystem, and your place in it, it is possible to avoid investing time and resources in endeavors that were doomed from the beginning. Developing a better understanding of the odds is the key to making better bets.

With firms putting out their best efforts, doing their traditional due diligence and focusing on execution, 10 of 100 innovation efforts meet their expectations and succeed. Ninety out of 100 fail. When we use a wide lens to examine initiatives and take their ecosystems into consideration, an amazing thing happens. We still cannot see which 10 will succeed, but we can make some pretty strong predictions about which 50 will lose. Making only half the bets means freeing up resources that we can now allocate to the top 50. With twice the resources on every initiative, we don't need a miracle to double the wins. *This is the path: eliminate avoidable failure; strategize more robust success.*

A Closing Wish

Each of us is an investor, responsible for allocating our own time and effort across multiple opportunities and competing demands. Many of us are further responsible for allocating other people's resources as well — their labor, their capital and their attention. Our goal is to make the best possible choices across a portfolio of opportunities that leave us — and those who depend on us — better off. By applying the wide-lens principles, you will be better able to expose the hidden sources of dependence that lurk beneath the surface of a strategy and be better equipped to manage them proactively and productively. ●

RECOMMENDED READING LIST

If you liked *The Wide Lens*, you'll also like:

- 1. *Escape Velocity* by Geoffrey A. Moore.** A pragmatic plan to drive established enterprises beyond past successes to next-generation growth.
- 2. *Flash Foresight* by Daniel Burrus.** Burrus shares seven radical "triggers" that can enable your company to see the invisible and do the impossible.
- 3. *Serial Innovators* by Claudio Feser.** A company must be able to continuously reinvent itself to stay relevant. Feser offers a guide for how it can be done.