



Chasing Stars

The Myth of Talent and the Portability of Performance

THE SUMMARY IN BRIEF

It is taken for granted in the knowledge economy that companies must employ the most talented performers to compete and succeed. Many firms try to buy stars by luring them away from competitors. In *Chasing Stars*, Harvard Business School Professor of Business Administration Boris Groysberg shows what an uncertain and disastrous practice this can be.


After examining the careers of more than 1,000 star analysts at Wall Street investment banks and conducting more than 200 interviews, Groysberg comes to a striking conclusion: Star analysts who change firms suffer an immediate and lasting decline in performance. Their earlier excellence appears to have depended heavily on their former firms' general and proprietary resources, organizational cultures, networks and colleagues. There are a few exceptions, such as stars who move with their teams and stars who switch to better firms. Female stars also perform better after changing jobs than their male counterparts do. But most stars who switch firms turn out to be meteors, quickly losing luster in their new settings.

Groysberg also explores how some Wall Street research departments are successfully growing, retaining and deploying their own stars.

Chasing Stars offers profound insights into the fundamental nature of outstanding performance. It also offers practical guidance to individuals on how to manage their careers strategically, and to companies on how to identify, develop and keep talent.

IN THIS SUMMARY, YOU WILL LEARN:

- How to save a fortune in poor hiring decisions.
- How even the brightest stars fall when not supported by their team members.
- Why you need to devote real resources to create a developmental, collaborative culture.
- How to win the war for talent.



by Boris Groysberg

CONTENTS

Introduction

Page 2

Part One: Talent and Portability

Page 3

Part Two: Facets of Portability

Page 4

Liftouts (Taking Some of It with You)

Page 5

Part Three: Implications for Talent Management: Developing, Retaining and Rewarding Stars

Page 6

A Special Case of Turnover

Page 7

Lessons from Wall Street and Elsewhere

Page 8

THE COMPLETE SUMMARY: CHASING STARS

by Boris Groysberg

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Introduction

Many knowledge-based firms view their employees as their most valuable resource. At such companies, where it is virtually an article of faith that settling for “B” players is a recipe for mediocrity, managers work hard to attract the best and the brightest. When companies do find first-rate talent, they’re often willing to offer those stars huge salaries, signing bonuses, stock options — in short, whatever it takes. The value of stars is a powerful idea, one that numerous books and management gurus have popularized over the past decade by invoking a so-called war for talent. This assumption is the cornerstone of many companies’ people-management strategies. On its face, the star hypothesis makes sense. After all, a firm can sustain a competitive advantage only if its strategic resources are valuable, rare, lacking substitutes and difficult to duplicate.

What Drives Outstanding Individual Performance?

But reliance on stars is a highly speculative managerial policy because we don’t really know very much about what drives outstanding individual performance. Little clear-cut evidence supports or refutes prevailing beliefs about why some people excel. Both stars and their employers often assume that outstanding performance is the result of a combination of innate talent and good educational preparation.

Another hazard of an unexamined reliance on stars is that the portability of talent — or, more accurately, the prevailing belief in such portability — cuts two ways. A prize-winning scientist may be a unique resource, for instance, but unless he or she is deeply embedded and

loyal, the attractiveness of his or her talents makes that scientist an unreliable source of sustainable competitive advantage. And there is also a risk for the firm that lures that star scientist away: Instead of continuing to excel, he or she might turn out to resemble a comet, quickly fading out in a new setting.

Portable Skills of Knowledge Workers

The extent to which skills are portable is also a compelling question for individual knowledge workers whose stock-in-trade is information and intellectual activity, whether or not they are stars in their fields. Knowledge workers are encouraged by popular career-guidance literature to think of themselves as resourceful free agents with portable stores of knowledge and skills. Determining whether the skills of knowledge workers are in fact portable from one firm to another — or to what degree and under what circumstances they are portable — can potentially shed light on the accuracy of this formulation and the wisdom of building one’s career on it.

Thus, the question of portability continues to offer a promising point of entry into the long-standing debate about the fundamental nature of exceptional performance. If we can determine whether stars’ performance is indeed portable from one employer to another, we may learn something fundamental about the origins and drivers of such performance. Are those who excel in the workplace mobile free agents with highly portable skills or is their performance primarily driven by adept use of the resources of the organization in which they thrive? An answer to this question, even an answer less cut and dried than popular wisdom or theoretical formulations, could shed new light on pressing managerial questions about how to hire, develop, compensate and retain talent. ●



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PART ONE: TALENT AND PORTABILITY

Moving On

Over the last few decades, an increasing number of employed Americans have been knowledge workers. And the growth of this employment sector is expected to continue: The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that professional occupations will grow most quickly and add more jobs than any other employment category in the United States between 2002 and 2014.

The individuals who hold such jobs — consultants, engineers, software developers, scientists, professors, physicians, technicians, attorneys and the like — view themselves as free agents with portable skills. They attribute their job performance largely to their own talent, skills and knowledge, and thus regard themselves as equipped to be equally productive in any appropriate workplace.

Free-Agent Careers

The concept of an elite work force composed of free agents with portable talent gained currency in the 1990s. Consultants urged talented knowledge workers to view themselves, in the words of one such book, as “free agents using different jobs and organizations as stepping-stones in their self-managed careers.”

The free-agent outlook places a premium on portable skills that can be put to use in a series of jobs, and in which validation and marketability derive not only from the employee-employer relationship, but from external networks of clients and peers. Thus, knowledge workers who expect to change jobs frequently — from one firm to another, between occupations or by switching to self-employment — have been repeatedly advised to acquire a portfolio of flexible skills transferable to other work situations and to cultivate extensive external networks.

More and more workers appear to be making employment choices on the strength of these propositions. One outcome of the tendency for knowledge workers to

What Are the ‘Unique Skills’ of Knowledge-Based Workers?

In the words of economist Oliver Williamson, knowledge-based workers, such as artists, researchers and administrators, have “unique skills [that] are rarely of a transaction-specific kind. On the contrary, most of these individuals could move to another organization without significant productivity loss.”

view themselves as free agents with portable intellectual talent is a fundamental shift in prevailing employment patterns from long-term employment to short-term transactional relationships between knowledge workers and their employers. The transferability of talent is particularly alarming to employers in businesses where the bond between top performers and their clients renders an individual’s client base mobile as well. As a result, firms have become increasingly willing to poach top talent from rival firms. ●

Analysts’ Labor Market

The security analysts we studied worked for investment banks, where they tracked firms in a particular industry and developed hypotheses about the economic futures of the companies they covered, typically 10 to 18 companies per analyst. Analysts write reports on these companies and issue recommendations on whether investors should buy, sell or hold the companies’ securities.

Star research analysts are widely regarded on Wall Street as free agents. Wall Street considers itself a meritocracy, and outstanding performance of any kind tends to be attributed to personal traits like raw intellectual power, knowledge and effort. But even in this competitive and self-congratulatory culture, research analysts’ skills are considered uniquely portable. “Analysts are one of the most mobile Wall Street professions because their expertise is portable,” said research director Fred Fraenkel, explaining perceptions on Wall Street. “I mean, you’ve got it when you’re here and you’ve got it when you’re there. The client base doesn’t change. You need your Rolodex and your files, and you’re in business.”

Nature Versus Nurture

What accounts for outstanding performance in knowledge-based professions? Are such job skills and performance records portable? To put the question another way, to what degree are exceptional performers like star equity analysts really the free agents they think they are?

In the absence of hard data, managers have typically adopted one of two competing explanations for outstanding performance which, for the sake of brevity, we will call *nature* and *nurture*. Those who attribute excellence to nature typically hire in large numbers, hoping that a few stars will emerge from the crowd, or try to lure proven performers away from other firms.

Adherents of nurture theory, on the other hand, maintain that stars can be homegrown through a mix of training, mentoring, incentives, and a resource-rich and supportive environment. These managers and firms try to

Summary: CHASING STARS

retain and spur on their best and brightest by providing constant training and mentoring, fostering loyalty and a long-term perspective, closely monitoring performance and offering an achievement-nurturing environment.

How can we attempt to sort out what drives star performance? As it happens, the labor market for security analysts exhibits a set of unusual characteristics that make it a remarkably suitable real-life laboratory for examining the sources of outstanding workplace performance. The unique features of this labor market may even make it possible to resolve some of the most pressing questions about the nature of stellar performance. ●

The Limits of Portability

To test whether ranked analysts' performance was portable, we set out to examine whether changing employers affected their rankings in the respected trade journal *Institutional Investor (II)*, controlling for individual, firm, sector and intertemporal variables. Using *II*'s annual rankings of the best equity analysts for 1988-96, we collected data on every ranked analyst who departed or joined a firm within one year of ranking. We identified 546 such moves, and then eliminated analysts who transferred to non-research positions or left investment banking entirely. The remaining 366 ranked analysts who joined competitors' research departments represented the core population for the study. Ranked analysts were employed by 78 different investment banks, but the top 24 firms accounted for fully 96 percent of all ranked analysts.

In short, our findings reveal that star analysts who switched employers paid a high price for jumping ship relative to comparable stars who stayed put. Overall, their job performance plunged sharply and continued to suffer for at least five years after moving to a new firm. This evidence refutes the prevailing belief in the industry that analysts' skills are thoroughly portable — independent of a particular firm where they work — and that analysts can move without suffering a decline in performance. ●

Do Firms Benefit from Hiring Stars?

Is the acquisition of a star performer value-enhancing for a firm? Some management theorists advocate hiring outsiders for the fresh perspectives and creativity they can contribute. One study claimed that the "ability to recruit talented people is the obvious first step to winning the talent war." Another made an analogy to genetics, praising the benefits of cross-breeding and alteration of the organization's genetic code. Other researchers have advo-

cated recruitment of outsiders in the interests of improving the performance of veteran employees and promoting competitiveness. Our evidence, however, shows that building capability by hiring stars does not work well. Three undesirable outcomes can ensue. As we've seen, the star's performance can suffer in the wake of the move. In addition, the much publicized outside hire can cause resentment in the department, with accompanying breakdown in morale, teamwork and communication. Finally, the firm can find that it paid more for its new star than is justified by the results.

Re-Evaluating the Hiring of Stars

Hiring a star should be a well-thought-out strategic decision, not a knee-jerk reaction to a perceived opportunity or emergency. Generally speaking, a firm should contemplate hiring a star only to fulfill a specific operational aim: to raise standards or introduce fresh ways of doing business, or to fill a critical slot when there is no time to train anyone internally.

Even when a firm has a clear-cut goal in mind, the potentially corrosive effects on morale and dedication of bringing in a newcomer need to be acknowledged and carefully weighed. There is no avoiding transplant shock. It is also hard to avoid scuttlebutt about the newcomer's salary or up-and-comers' preoccupation with what the new hire means for their own opportunities to advance.

A clear strategy for integrating the newcomer into the department is crucial. In recruitment, it is imperative to keep in mind the larger truth that what ultimately adds value to the firm is the net combination of all its employees. ●

PART TWO: FACETS OF PORTABILITY

Stars and Their Galaxies

In general, firms in our study whose analysts scored low on performance portability also had low turnover. Stars from portability-oriented firms, like Montgomery, Credit Suisse First Boston and Salomon Brothers, opted for exits more frequently than stars from nonportability-oriented firms, like Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch. The experience of nonportability companies suggests a powerful connection between keeping employees embedded in firm-specific human capital and processes, and limiting their ability to achieve star performance elsewhere. Both outcomes can result from essentially the same input: an idiosyncratic product, unique culture, system or set of practices that yields firm-specific human capital.

Summary: CHASING STARS

These outcomes differ in one respect, however. Promoting nonportability of performance is rarely, if ever, an explicit corporate goal. Rather, firms that employ knowledge workers seek to make the most of those employees' valuable skills, and different approaches to doing so happen to promote or limit portability.

Fundamentally, portability depends on whether any other firm has an equivalent model. No other firms produced research reports the same way that analysts did at Sanford C. Bernstein. No other firm had Merrill Lynch's systems. And how people are managed and developed reinforces these idiosyncratic products, processes, structures, systems and cultures. Retention, by contrast, is an explicit goal at many firms. In a research department, for example, an analyst lost to a competitor becomes costly in several ways: The investment in training is lost; the analyst has to be replaced at high cost; the replacement must be trained; and the competing firm enjoys the fruits of the former employer's investment in training. Firms that depend on knowledge work would thus do well to link their retention efforts strategically to efforts to create nonportable (and valuable) firm-specific human capital.

Specifically, firms can benefit from understanding — and strategically communicating — how much value they add to their employees' performance. ●

Integrating Stars

Most research on integrating new employees, a field known as *organizational socialization*, looks at inexperienced workers. When we begin to examine the integration of experienced professionals, we are entering virtually uncharted territory. Very little is known about integrating experienced professionals into a new organization.

Many investment banks expect that they can simply “plug and play” a star. But the integration process is rarely that simple. Even stars need time to adjust to new settings, and successful integration has as much to do with the attitudes of veteran employees as it does with the newcomer.

During our interviews, we learned that most research departments had no systematic strategies for integrating star newcomers into their firms. One research director spoke for many of his counterparts: “Obviously, you work to try to get them comfortable with your people and make them feel welcome in the firm, but we probably had about 80 research professionals and we had one research manager. So there just isn't a lot of time for a lot of team building.”

Think Deeply About Hiring and Assimilation

It was striking, however, that the companies that assimilated stars most successfully were those that had

thought deeply about both hiring and assimilation, and had drawn up systematic plans to guide both processes. These companies took the time and effort to analyze and anatomize their own cultures and to pinpoint the desirable attitudes of the stars they had developed in-house. They then set about very deliberately to replicate those attributes by seeking out stars with the same qualities from firms with similar cultures. Furthermore, the best recruiters didn't simply shop locally. They looked beyond best-known firms to identify up-and-comers and relatively less-known stars from regional firms and even from global markets (keeping an eye on cultural-compatibility issues all the while).

We found only a few companies among the 24 investment banks studied in-depth that had thought rigorously about hiring and integration: Two of these firms were DLJ and Goldman Sachs. The other management — whose new analysts also had high rates of post-move success — was unwilling to fully discuss their integration strategies, which were guarded carefully as a vital source of competitive advantage. ●

Liftouts (Taking Some of It with You)

Among star analysts who changed employers between 1988 and 1996, those who moved in teams performed better than those who moved solo. In fact, analysts who changed employers along with teammates suffered no significant decline in performance, in contrast to the decline of those who moved alone. This finding suggests that team-specific human capital accounts for a significant portion of those analysts' performance.

The effect on short-term performance of moving solo was larger than that of changing firms with teammates. The probability of ranking first in the first full year after moving was almost twice as high for analysts who switched employers with teammates as for those who moved solo. This finding provides strong evidence for the effect of in-house relationships on performance. Stars do not develop in a vacuum; their performance depends heavily on the people with whom they work. If they can bring some of that firm-specific relational capital with them from one employer to another, their chances of maintaining their exceptional performance increase dramatically.

Out of 366 ranked analysts' moves, 100 were with other ranked analysts, junior analysts, institutional salespeople or traders. Paine Webber and Alex. Brown & Sons appeared to have built new franchises around superstars by simultaneously hiring complementary staff.

Summary: CHASING STARS

Kidder and Deutsche Bank brought in star analysts only as opportunistic individual hires.

Interestingly enough, the market reacted more negatively to team hires than to solo hires, suggesting that investors believe that firms overpay more to attract teams than they do to capture individuals.

The Stages of a Successful Liftout

In the course of research across a number of industries, we identified four consecutive and mutually interdependent stages that must be worked through for a liftout to succeed:

- The *courtship stage*, before the move, when two series of conversations take place: one between the leader of the team and the leaders of the company interested in bringing the team onboard. During this phase the participants align business goals and expectations, ensure that the market opportunity the liftout is intended to exploit genuinely exists, discuss how they should be integrated with existing staff and ensure that the leader will receive the resources necessary to succeed.
- *Leadership integration*, post-move, in which the leader of the lifted-out team aligns expectations and begins to build relationships and firm-specific human capital in the new environment.
- *Operational integration*, when the leader of the team channels resources to the team, providing them the wherewithal to succeed on an observable level and to gain credibility.
- *Full cultural integration*, during which team members develop relationships with their new co-workers, exchange best practices and are able to build sources of firm- and team-specific capital outside the liftout team in their new firm. ●

Women and Portability

One group of analysts reliably maintained their star rankings even after changing employers: women. Unlike their male counterparts, female stars who changed employers performed just as well as those who stayed put.

In our interviews, we found two overarching explanations for women's portability. First, the best female analysts appeared to have built their franchises on external relationships with clients and the companies they covered, rather than on relationships with their firms. By contrast, male stars built up more firm- and team-specific human capital, investing more in the internal networks and unique resources of the firms where they worked. Hence, in the course of becoming stars, female analysts' performance became portable in a way their male colleagues' did not.

Second, although they relied less on firm-specific capabilities and relationships, women were more careful when assessing a prospective employer. They evaluated possible employers more cautiously and analyzed more factors than men did before deciding to uproot themselves from a company where they had already been successful. Female star analysts, it would appear, took their work environment more seriously yet relied on it less than male stars did. They looked for an employer that would allow them to continue building successful franchises their own way.

The portability of women's performance thus appeared to be the result of strategic choices women analysts made in response to situations they faced at investment banks. Finding it difficult to build relationships with male colleagues, they instead built networks of external ties to clients and to the industries they covered and forged unconventional boundary-spanning in-house alliances. Aware of the sexism that pervaded investment-banking culture, they took care to ensure that a given bank would provide them with the platform they needed to be successful and not hold them back on account of their gender. ●

PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS FOR TALENT MANAGEMENT: DEVELOPING, RETAINING AND REWARDING STARS

Star Formation

If portability of star-quality performance is more often a myth than a reality, it is crucial for knowledge-based firms to figure out how to cultivate and retain their own stars. On Wall Street it was uncommon to do so. Research departments rarely provided formal training or mentoring to supplement the traditional apprenticeship method (assigning a junior analyst to assist a senior analyst, who may or may not have seen fit to oversee the junior's development). Even less common was a concerted internal effort to develop analysts into stars; the most popular means of acquiring star analysts was to lure them from other firms. Only a handful of Wall Street research departments successfully developed their own stars.

Over the course of our study, only nine firms developed more than 8 percent of their analysts into stars. The percentage of unranked analysts who eventually became stars at a given firm varied from 15.4 percent at DLJ and 14.9 percent at Sanford C. Bernstein to only 3 percent at Merrill Lynch and 0.6 percent at UBS. Firms with what we call developmental cultures were far more successful at both producing and retaining stars. Such

firms enjoyed a star-formation rate of 11 percent, compared to 5.4 percent at other firms.

The seven firms with developmental cultures invested significant funding and effort over a considerable period of time in systematic training and mentoring. The other firms had virtually no consistent mentoring or training programs, formal or informal.

It is striking that many of the developmental approaches turned out to share certain identifiable features. These shared characteristics were (1) individualized developmental agendas; (2) cross-fertilization via peer mentoring, mutual critiquing of work products, and sharing best practices and processes rather than affiliating exclusively with one method; (3) the research director's energetic involvement and support of in-house development; and (4) ongoing, open-ended development of mid-career analysts as well as beginners. ●

Turnover

Turnover is a complex phenomenon. We found, first of all, that multiple factors — individual, departmental, firm related, sectoral and macroeconomic — influenced turnover. Second, we found that stars were less likely than non-star analysts to leave their employers. Certain organizational dynamics were also noteworthy: Analysts at firms boasting higher-quality personnel at various levels of the organization were less likely to move. This is an argument for enriching the environment for stars in order to increase retention.

One implication of these findings is that managers' ability to retain employees depends in part on factors outside their control. Managers rarely have much influence, for example, over the quality of employees in related departments whose performance affects people under their supervision. They exercise no sway over the performance of an entire sector or of the broader economy.

Stars might enjoy greater firm-specific skills than non-stars because they have received more training, mentoring or firm resources. Another explanation is that stardom in itself might make an individual more cautious about upsetting the applecart (tinkering with a “good thing”) even without specifically crediting any particular features of the existing situation. And, by the same token, the cumulative experience of aiming at a goal and missing it (and thus earning less and enjoying less status) might tend to make non-stars more globally dissatisfied and/or restless.

Individual idiosyncrasies also affect turnover. Fundamentally, turnover is an aggregate measure of numerous decisions that individuals make in expectation that they can do better elsewhere. ●

A Special Case of Turnover

Highly capable star analysts quit their jobs to become entrepreneurs at a higher rate than did more run-of-the-mill analysts. Then, having established their new enterprises, more stars than ordinary performers survived as entrepreneurs, and still more survived when the economy was healthy.

More surprising is the actual rate of three-year survival for ranked analysts' entrepreneurial ventures: 57 percent (as compared to 29 percent for unranked analysts). It is difficult to know how to interpret this finding. In relative terms, this number seems low, especially compared to other professional labor markets.

What does this survival rate tell us about talent and its portability? The least arguable conclusions may merely confirm some unsurprising truths. Talent matters, for instance — hence the superior performance of stars — but it doesn't conquer all. Even the prodigiously talented need a sound idea, capital, good timing, dedicated employees, a platform, systems, energy, confidence and self-knowledge to go it alone. Talent that has been narrowly focused can only sometimes be transformed into a service that the market is willing to pay for separately. And talent might also be best leveraged when market conditions are optimal.

Our findings do suggest, at a minimum, that many analysts' franchises were not portable to entrepreneurial endeavors. Some analysts' skills are so firm-specific that they are not portable at all. Analysts who became entrepreneurs had to learn new skills. Most had to become managers as well as producers, and they had to master general management skills very quickly. And those who started non-research firms or firms in industries that they were not familiar with had the added pressure of learning their way around a new industry context. ●

Measuring and Rewarding Stars' Performance

IT's rankings were by no means the only rating of analysts' skills. *The Wall Street Journal*, Reuters, Greenwich Associates and several other firms regularly assessed analysts' performance. And both client firms and analysts' own departments compiled data about analysts' track records and activities. Much of this information sought to measure, in various ways, prevailing opinions at client firms about the relative value of individual analysts' output. Analysts themselves tended to prefer highly objective external measures because such measures kept them marketable outside their firms.

Summary: CHASING STARS

How research directors used the vast amount of information available on analyst performance depended on whether their firms were developmental or not and whether they tended to impart portable or nonportable skills. The most avid consumers of information on analysts' performance were undoubtedly hands-on research directors. These were the same research directors, by and large, who paid close attention to developing talent and often to promoting teamwork and distinctive nonportable ways of working. Compensation was linked to performance in all research departments, but many hands-on research directors also tended to use performance data separately for development.

Who Is Succeeding and Who Is Not?

The literature on compensation, rewards and incentives, though diverse, is virtually unanimous that an assessment-and-compensation policy needs to be congruent with the firm's overall culture and strategy. ●

Determinants of Portability

We identified a handful of factors that have a decisive impact on portability of performance:

- *The relative quality of the two firms matters.* Stars who moved to superior firms experienced no decline in short- or long-term performance relative to their counterparts who stayed put. Those who moved to weaker (less resource-rich) firms experienced the sharpest declines in performance.
- *The orientation of the employee's firm of origin matters.* Stars who left portability-oriented firms that promoted general human capital performed just as well after moving as stars who stayed put.
- *The hiring and integration capacities of the new firm matter.* The rate at which newly hired stars maintained their ranking or regained it within a year ranged from more than 94 percent at companies most adept at integration to a low of 17 percent.
- *The function an analyst is hired to perform matters.* Stars hired to support existing capabilities performed far better than those hired to initiate coverage of a new sector.
- *Leaving solo or with a team matters.* Analysts who changed employers along with teammates suffered no significant decline in short- or long-term performance relative to comparable star analysts who did not move.
- *Gender matters.* Women's post-move performance surpassed men's.

Lessons from Wall Street and Elsewhere

Researchers look at portability for two reasons, one descriptive and one prescriptive. The descriptive goal is to use portability of performance as a way of examining the nature and sources of exceptional performance. The degree to which individual performance is portable and the circumstances in which it is portable hold the promise of telling us something fundamental about that performance. The prescriptive goal is to offer applicable insight to firms about how to acquire, motivate, retain and compensate talented employees, and to individuals about how to manage their capabilities, resources and opportunities. In both instances, mobility is a phenomenon that offers a window into the nature of knowledge-based work, and portability is the applicable metric.

We found that exceptional performance was more context-dependent than is explicitly recognized by star performers or their employers. The overall decline in performance that accompanied star analysts' career moves demonstrates that the loss of firm-specific resources and relationships has a detrimental effect.

Many Paths to Superior Performance

For both firms and individuals, there is more than one path to superior performance. But it is important to keep in mind as well that firm-specific human capital, of whatever kind — unique systems, specialized training, collaboration, interaction with colleagues — is highly likely to have performance-promoting value for those who possess it. Firm-specific undertakings require effort and investment on the part of the individual employee and thus would not be pursued except in anticipation of a payoff in enhanced performance, compensation and/or tenure. Firms that provide these sources of firm-specificity, and hold forth the credible promise of enhanced performance, compensation and/or tenure for engaging in them, can reap a powerful benefit: They can keep their star performers imperfectly mobile and thus create a potential source of sustained competitive advantage. ●

RECOMMENDED READING LIST

If you liked *Chasing Stars*, you'll also like:

1. ***Topgrading* by Bradford D. Smart.** Great companies depend on people. Smart's advice gives you an unbeatable hiring advantage.
2. ***Who* by Geoff Smart and Randy Street.** The authors provide a simple, practical and effective solution for the single biggest problem in business today: unsuccessful hiring.
3. ***The 2020 Workplace* by Jeanne C. Meister and Karie Willyerd.** This title is a useful guide to help you and your organization create tomorrow's workplace of choice and meet the needs of your future employees.